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The construct of risk taking is studied through the prism of the relation between tonic
arousal and risk taking behavior. Several theories have proposed that high aroused individ-
ualstendtoexhibitriskaversion.Wepositthatthisarousal–behaviorassociationisactivated
much more strongly in risks with losses, as losses increase arousal and trigger relevant
traits associated with the sensitivity to risk. In three studies we examined risk taking in
experience-based decision tasks, with either token losses or relative-losses (in the gain
domain). In Study 1 we found a negative correlation between pre-task pupil diameter and
risk taking in the loss domain but not in the gain domain. In Study 2 we re-analyzed a
previous pupillometry dataset involving symmetric mixed gains and losses.We found that
the negative correlation in this mixed condition emerged even while the participants did
not show loss aversion. This ﬁnding was replicated in Study 3. Thus, the effect of losses
on arousal provides sufﬁcient conditions for the moderation of the tonic arousal–behavior
association. The ﬁndings suggest an important role for losses in the psychological and
physiological experience of risk.
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INTRODUCTION
In this study we examine the relation between losses and the
psychophysiological experience of risk. Economic theory tradi-
tionally deﬁnes risk attitude as the sensitivity to payoff vari-
ance (Markowitz, 1952; Pratt, 1964; Sharpe, 1964; and see recent
studies which relate brain activity to perceptions of risk as vari-
ance, e.g., Preuschoff et al., 2006, 2008). Yet several theories have
proposed that losses are somehow implicated in the feeling of
risk. For example, Coombs and Lehner (1981, 1984) examined
a basic lottery where individuals have an equal chance of win-
ning or losing $10. They found that adding $10 to the loss
increased perceived risk more than adding the same amount
to the gain, and therefore suggested that the constructs of risk
and loss are not independent (see also Duxbury and Summers,
2004). A similar argument is made by attention-based theories
of losses, though these theories posit a more general effect of
losses on the sensitivity to incentives (Taylor, 1991; Yechiam and
Hochman,2011).Prospecttheory(KahnemanandTversky,1979)
likewise argues that loss aversion is an important component
that steers people away from taking risk when it involves gains
and losses, because the subjective weight of losses is larger than
the subjective weight of equivalent gains. We examine whether
losses are an inherent part of what make things risky through
the prism of the relation between tonic arousal and risk taking
behavior.
Several theories of personality have converged to predict a
negative association between tonic arousal and risk taking. In
their sensation seeking theory, Zuckerman et al. (1964) suggested
that individuals differ in the level of stimulation required for
maintaining optimal arousal, with those exhibiting lower levels
of arousal requiring more stimulation in order to reach their
optimal level of arousal. Since risk taking is one form by which
stimulation is achieved, this account suggests that low tonic
arousal is associated with a greater tendency to take risk (Far-
ley and Farley, 1972; Ellis, 1987; McNamara and Ballard, 1999)1.
Eysenck’s (1967) personality theory similarly characterized extro-
verts as low-arousal individuals, who seek stimulating activities
in order to heighten their arousal levels (see also Gray, 1987).
A somewhat modiﬁed account appears in theories of trait anx-
iety (Zuckerman, 1960; Eysenck, 1992). The literature on trait
anxiety suggests that anxious individuals are chronically more
aroused on the one hand, and avoid risk and uncertainty on
the other (Eysenck, 1992); thus, high arousal is naturally asso-
ciated with risk aversion. In support of this prediction, studies
haveshownthathighsensationseekersexhibitlowergalvanicskin
response (GSR) in response to various stimuli (Stelmack et al.,
1983; Plouffe and Stelmack, 1986) and even at rest (Gatzke-Kopp
et al.,2002).
We propose that the association between tonic arousal and risk
taking is moderated by the presence of losses in the experience
of risk. It is relatively well known that losses increase arousal
and attention (Taylor,1991; Rozin and Royzman,2001). Recently,
several studies have found that this attentional effect is exhib-
ited independently from loss aversion (Hochman et al., 2010;
HochmanandYechiam,2011;YechiamandTelpaz,inpress).Based
on these ﬁndings, we have proposed that this attentional effect of
losses provides sufﬁcient conditions for many of the phenomena
attributed to losses (Yechiam and Hochman, 2011). For example,
it was found that the effect of losses on consistency in risk taking
1In later writings Zuckerman (1990) maintained the idea of a negative association
between arousal level and sensation seeking but focused on the complex interaction
between the high reactivity of the dopaminergic system and the weakly reactive
serotonergic system.
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behavior emerges even in the absence of loss aversion (Yechiam
and Telpaz, in press). Similarly, the effect of losses on decision
performance was demonstrated even in tasks where usually par-
ticipants exhibit no loss aversion (Bereby-Meyer and Erev, 1998;
Erev et al.,1999). These effects are explained by a mere increase in
on-task attention in response to losses.
Here, we extend this argument to suggest that because losses
increase arousal and attention more than gains, risks with losses
are more“rewarding”for individuals with low tonic arousal. Like-
wise,riskswithoutlossesarelessintimidatingforthosehavinghigh
arousal. Thus, without losses sensation seekers might not consis-
tently relish and replenish on the risky experience, while anxious
people might not be consistently intimidated by it. Therefore, the
postulatednegativecorrelationbetweentonicarousalandrisktak-
ingisobservedmorereliablyforriskysituationsthatinvolvelosses.
It is further predicted that this effect of losses is not contingent on
the decision weight asymmetry induced by losses (i.e., loss aver-
sion; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). We suggest that the arousal
and attention produced by losses are sufﬁcient for producing this
effect.
Toexaminethesepredictions,weusedapupillometricmeasure
of tonic arousal. The pupil diameter (PD) is an immediate and
direct index of autonomic activation (Granholm and Steinhauer,
2004). Changes in PD are controlled by two muscles, the dilator
and the sphincter, which are differentially inﬂuenced by activity
in the sympathetic and parasympathetic branches of the auto-
nomic nervous system. The former channel is mediated primarily
by norepinephrine and the latter by acetylcholine (Hutchins and
Corbett,1997). Thus, differently from the GSR, the PD is affected
by both branches modulating autonomic arousal, and not only
the sympathetic branch. Parasympathetic arousal may be relevant
to risk taking behavior since this system is known to have a role
in defensive reaction and anxiety (Lyonﬁelds et al., 1995). Also,
importantly, the tonic PD is unaffected by physical ﬁtness fac-
tors (Filipe et al., 2003) and body mass (Piha et al., 1994; Filipe
et al., 2003), which is not the case in other autonomic measures,
such as heart rate and blood pressure (Gelber et al., 1997; Ren-
nie et al., 2003). Accordingly, individual differences in physical
capability affect tonic PD to a lesser extent than in other arousal
measures.
There is very little data on whether PD is a reliable measure
of tonic arousal. To clarify this issue, we conducted a pilot study
where we measured the mean pupil size of 26 student participants
for1minduringrest,ontwoconsecutivedays.Thetest–retestcor-
relation between the different measurements was high (r =0.83,
p <0.01),supportingthereliabilityofthePDasameasureoftonic
arousal.
STUDY 1: LOSS VERSUS GAIN DOMAIN RISKS
In this study we focused on two choice problems, one involving
risks in the gain domain and the other involving risks in the loss
domain. The two choice problems were as follows:
Problem 1. Gain Condition:
S 600 with certainty
R 0 or 1200 with equal probability P(R)=0.38
Problem 2. Loss Condition:
S −600 with certainty
R −1200 or 0 with equal probability P(R)=0.52
Ineachchoiceproblem,theparticipantsselectedamongtwoalter-
nativeswithequalexpectedvalue,asafealternative(S)andariskier
alternative (R). These two problems are identical but for fact that
in the Loss condition all outcomes are multiplied by −1. P(R)
denotes the average proportion of R selections in Study 1.
The two choice problems were administered in an experience-
based task. The participants were not provided with a writ-
ten description of the payoffs but rather had to learn to make
choices by sampling the alternatives and receiving feedback. The
task began with the participant facing two blank buttons. Upon
selecting a button a payoff was sampled from the alternative’s
payoff distribution and the participant was presented with this
payoff as feedback. The use of experience-based tasks is com-
mon in studies of physiological arousal and brain activity (e.g.,
Bechara et al., 1997). Risk taking in these experiential tasks
is typically operationalized as the average proportion of selec-
tions from the alternative with the higher variance payoffs (see
Yechiam and Ert, 2011). Our main prediction was that the asso-
ciation between tonic pupil size (as recorded prior to the task)
and risk taking level would be more pronounced in the Loss
condition.
METHOD
Participants
The participants were 20 undergraduates from the Technion (12
men and 8 women). Their average age was 23 (ranging from 20
to 27). Upon completing the experiment, they were given a ﬁxed
fee which was updated according to the accumulated amount of
tokens won (or lost) in the experimental task. The conversion rate
of experimental tokens to money was 1 Israeli Shekel per 1000
point earned (participants were informed of the conversion rate
beforehand).
Behavioral task
All participants completed two experience-based decision tasks
involving 100 trials. Half of them performed the Loss condition
taskfollowedbytheGainconditiontaskandtheothersperformed
the tasks in reverse order. In both tasks, they were asked to oper-
ate a “money machine” with two choice alternatives presented as
blank virtual buttons (see Hertwig et al.,2004;Newell and Rakow,
2007;Erev and Haruvy,in press). They were informed simply that
their task would be to repeatedly select a button in the machine
in order to maximize their total earning. They were further told
that they would perform two tasks but their ﬁnal payoffs would
be set according to the accumulating amount from one of the
tasks,selected at random. This was done to prevent diversiﬁcation
biases and income effects across different tasks (Cho and Luce,
1995).
Each button selection was followed by the presentation of
the obtained payoff and the accumulated payoff, allowing par-
ticipants to learn to select the choice alternatives from their
experience. The outcomes from the two buttons were drawn
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from the payoff distributions for the Gain and Loss condition
problems presented above. The allocation of the Safe and Risky
alternative to the left and right buttons was randomized for each
participant, but was kept constant throughout an experimen-
tal condition (e.g., in the Gain condition). The outcomes were
randomly generated on each trial from the alternative’s payoff
distribution.
PD measure
Pupillometry data was collected usingViewPoint PC 60 EyeFrame
system (Arrington Research, Scottsdale, Arizona). The system
operates with a single tiny camera and an infrared illuminator
mounted on a lightweight frame facing toward the participant’s
dominant eye, and supported by comfortable head straps. It
records pupil data at approximately 30 frames per second (fps).
Pre-task pupil size samples were taken just after the calibration
and prior to the start of the decision-making task for a period
of 30s. During this time the participants looked at the center of
the screen and were asked to wait for the experimenter’s instruc-
tions. The eye tracking measures continued while the participants
performed the decision task.
Like other autonomic measures (e.g.,GSR) the tonic pupil size
isaffectedbygender,withsomestudiesdemonstratinglargerpupil
sizesforwomenthanmen(Zinn,1972;Alexandridis,1985)though
this is disputed (see Jones, 1990; Filipe et al., 2003). Accordingly,
we examined the possible effect of gender on the pre-task PD, as
well as on risk taking levels.
Design and analysis
Ourmainpredictionpertainedtothenegativeassociationbetween
pre-task arousal and risk taking in the two within-subject task
conditions.We therefore used a one-tailed test for this analysis (as
explicitly noted in the results below). For all other analyses, we
used two-tailed tests.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Risk taking and pupil diameter during the task
The average proportion of risky selections in the Gain condition
was 0.38 (SD=0.23), while in the Loss condition it was 0.52
(SD=0.24). Thus, the ﬁndings show greater risk seeking with
losses. This pattern is similar to the reﬂection effect observed by
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979). An examination of the median
behaviorshowedmoredistinctchangesinrisktakingasafunction
of the payoff domain, with 0.4 selections of the risky alternative
in the Gain condition and 0.63 in the Loss condition. This differ-
encebetweenconditionswasstatisticallysigniﬁcant[t(19)=2.38,
p =0.03].ThecorrelationbetweenP(R)inthetwoconditionswas
r =0.37, p =0.10; as found previously (Ert and Yechiam, 2010;
Yechiam and Ert, 2011) participants had a somewhat consistent
tendency to prefer certainty to risk or vise versa,though it was not
statistically signiﬁcant.
Although our main predictions pertained to pre-task PD, we
also measured the PD during the task. The results are shown
in Figure 1. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Satterthwaite
et al., 2007; Hochman and Yechiam, 2011) the participants’ PD
was higher following losses (of −1200 or −600) compared to
equivalent gains. The difference between the PD following losses
FIGURE 1 | Mean pupil diameter in the Loss and Gain conditions (in
mm) across participants and events (of loss: − 600 or − 1200, or of
gain: 600 or 1200).Time zero denotes the outcome presentation onset.
and gains was signiﬁcant 0.375–0.875s following the outcome
presentation [t(19)=2.71,p =0.04]2.
To examine the effect of losses on extended arousal we also
compared the response time in the Gain and Loss conditions (see
Porges,1992).Previously,RTswerefoundtobelongerinlosscom-
paredtogaindomaintasks(e.g.,YechiamandTelpaz,inpress).The
average RT in the Loss condition was 0.61s while in the Gain con-
dition it was 0.46s. The difference was signiﬁcant [t(19)=2.52,
p =0.02].Thus,lossesseemedtoincreasebothimmediatearousal
and processing time beyond gains.
Pre-task pupil diameter
Scatter plots of risk taking proportions by pre-task PD appear
in Figure 2. As clearly indicated in the ﬁgure, individuals with
high pre-task PD tended to make fewer risky selections in the
Loss condition, but this was much less evident in the Gain
condition. In the Loss condition the correlation between pre-
task PD and P(R) was r=−0.44, p =0.026 (one tailed). In the
gain condition the correlation was only r =−0.25, p =0.15 (one
tailed).
To verify that this result is not due to women partici-
pants having larger PDs (as found previously; e.g., Alexan-
dridis, 1985) and also taking less risk, we examined gender dif-
ferences in the studied variables. The pre-task PD in women
(Mean=3.62mm, SD=0.40) was actually smaller than that of
the men (Mean=4.26mm,SD=0.40),but the difference did not
reach signiﬁcance t(18)=1.69, p=0.11. Additionally, there were
no signiﬁcant gender differences in the proportion of risky selec-
tionsintheLossandGainconditions.Wecanthusruleoutgender
as leading to major differences in the studied variables.
The results are consistent with our prediction that tonic
arousal – risk taking associations should be stronger in the
Loss condition compared to the Gain condition. The direction
of the effect is in turn consistent with the prediction of the
2NotethatasshowninFigure1therewasa(non-signiﬁcant)differenceinPDbefore
obtaining losses and gains. This is to be expected given the fact that the participants
knew they were about to face losses.
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FIGURE 2 | Scatter plot and regression lines of the proportion of risky
selections across 100 trials by pre-task PD in Study 1.Top: Loss
condition. Bottom: Gain condition.
aforementioned personality theories: those showing low-arousal
tended to take more risk. We have argued that this phenomenon
is due to the attentional effects of losses. However, an alternative
explanation is that it is due to loss aversion. If one assumes that
(a) losses have greater subjective weight than gains, and (b) peo-
ple behave more reliably in tasks that are of importance to them
(Judd and Krosnick, 1989; Chaiken and Maheswaran, 1994; Kan-
fer et al., 1994), then it stands to reason that individuals would
exhibit more reliable risk taking behavior in a loss-domain task.
Loss aversion can therefore increase the association between tonic
arousal and risk taking behavior. In our second study we therefore
examined whether these effect of losses can be observed simul-
taneously with no loss aversion, namely with the participants
showing no behavioral tendency to give greater weight to losses
over gains.
STUDY 2: MIXED GAINS AND LOSSES RISK
In experience-based tasks it was previously found that people do
not display loss aversion when the risk involves symmetric gains
and losses (see Erev et al., 2008; Silberberg et al., 2008; Hochman
andYechiam,2011;YechiamandTelpaz,inpress).Whilethegener-
ality of this ﬁnding into other situations is a matter or controversy
(Rick,2011),thefactthatintheexperientialsettingthereisnoloss
aversion provides a testing ground for whether different effects
of losses may emerge even in the absence of a decision weight
asymmetryofthesortproposedbyKahnemanandTversky(1979).
The study focused on the following two choice problems:
Problem 3. Gain Condition:
S 2 or 4 with equal probability
R 1 or 5 with equal probability P(R)=0.49
Problem 4. Mixed Condition:
S −1 or 1 with equal probability
R −2 or 2 with equal probability P(R)=0.54
The term Mixed refers to a choice problem producing both gains
and losses. In the studied Mixed condition the risky alternative
producedgainsandlossesof thesameprobabilityandmagnitude.
Under loss aversion people should avoid risk in this situation.
An existing pupillometry dataset (Hochman and Yechiam, 2011;
Study1)inwhichthesetwoproblemswereadministeredwasused.
Previousanalysesof thedatafocusedonlyonphasic(i.e.,on-task)
arousal (Hochman and Yechiam, 2011). We tested whether the
associationbetweentonicpupilsizeandrisktakingwouldbemore
pronounced in risks with losses, even while the participants were
loss neutral.
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-ﬁve undergraduates from the Technion (13 men and 12
women) participated in the study. The participants were given
a ﬁxed fee and were also compensated according to the number
of points earned in the experimental task, at a rate of 0.1 Israeli
Shekel per 1 point earned (they were informed of the conversion
rate beforehand).
Behavioral task
All participants completed two experience-based decision tasks
involving 60 trials. Approximately half of them performed the
Mixed condition task followed by the Gain condition task and
the other half performed the tasks in reverse order. The instruc-
tions were as in Study 1. The tasks involved operating a “money
machine” with two choice alternatives. The payoffs were drawn
from the outcomes of the Gain and Mixed conditions above. In
order to make the incentive structure less obvious, a constant of
0.1–0.5 (in 0.1 intervals) was randomly added or subtracted from
the sampled payoff in every trial. Additionally,to eliminate possi-
ble surprise effects that would be non-symmetric with respect to
gains and losses,payoffs were delivered in a deterministic fashion.
Each choice alternative initially produced either a gain/relative-
gain or a loss/relative-loss, which was switched to a payoff from
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the opposite domain on each selection. About half of the partici-
pantswerepresentedwithagain/relative-gainintheﬁrstselection,
while for the other participants this order was reversed.
PD measure
Pre-task pupil size was examined as in Study 1. Due to a technical
problem we did not get pre-task results from two of the partici-
pants. Thus, all correlations with tonic PD are based on a sample
size of 23.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As reported in HochmanandYechiam(2011),theaveragepropor-
tionofriskyselectionsintheMixedconditionwasnotsigniﬁcantly
different from 0.5 (Mean=0.54, SD=0.15). Clearly, the partici-
pants did not avoid the alternative incurring larger losses. Addi-
tionally, the average proportion of risky selections in the Mixed
condition and in the Gain condition (Mean=0.49, SD=0.23)
was quite similar, t(24)=1.07, p =0.30. Thus, the participants
exhibited no loss aversion in this experience-based choice task.
Differently from Study 1,the correlation between risky choices
in the two task conditions was close to zero (r =−0.02,p =0.91).
This is consistent with previous results showing that consistency
across domains is impaired when there is no sure thing alternative
(Yechiam and Ert, 2011).
Scatter plots of risk taking proportions by pre-task PD appear
in Figure 3. As illustrated in the ﬁgure, individuals with high
pre-task PD tended to take less risk in the Mixed condition.
In the Gain condition a surprising reverse trend was observed:
those with higher pre-task PD actually took more risk. Correla-
tion analyses showed that in the Mixed condition the pre-task PD
was negatively correlated with the proportion of risky choices,
r=−0.37, p =0.04 (one tailed), while in the Gain condition,
pre-task PD was positively correlated with risky choices, r=0.47,
p =0.02.
We examined whether the positive effect found in the Gain
condition is a product of boredom at the end of the task. Pre-
vious ﬁndings suggest that in monotonous tasks that have little
cognitiverequirement,individualswithmoderatelevelsof arousal
seek to maintain their arousal (Fischer et al., 2008). One way to
increase arousal may be to explore both alternatives and thus to
also take risk (see Iglesias-Parro et al., 2001). Possibly, this situ-
ation was more likely to develop in the Gain condition because
losses are more arousing. Also, recall that the task in Study
2 was more monotonic than in Study 1 because of the gain–
loss–gain–loss pattern. In the ﬁrst half of the task, the negative
correlation for the Mixed condition remained about the same,
r =−0.41, p =0.05. By contrast, the positive correlation in the
Gain task was found to be non-signiﬁcant, r =0.30, p =0.17.
Thus, consistent with the boredom-based explanation, the pos-
itive correlation for the Gain condition emerged only in the sec-
ond half of the task (Gain: r =43, p =0.04; Mixed: r =−0.40,
p =0.06).Forbothhalvesof thetask,thenegativecorrelationpre-
dicted by personality theories was only apparent when the risk
involved losses, and this was found simultaneously with no loss
aversion.
We also examined gender differences in the studied variables.
The pre-task PD in women (Mean=4.59mm, SD=1.59) was
FIGURE 3 | Scatter plot and regression lines of the proportion of risky
selections across trials by pre-task PD in Study 2.Top: Mixed condition.
Bottom: Gain condition.
larger than that of the men (Mean=3.92mm,SD=0.85) but not
in a signiﬁcant manner,t(21)=1.24,p=0.22. Additionally,there
were no signiﬁcant gender differences in the proportion of risky
selections in the Mixed and Gain conditions. In fact, when aggre-
gating the results across the two studies, the PD for both genders
was quite similar (mean difference of 0.09mm).
STUDY 3: REPLICATION USING MIXED GAINS AND LOSSES
To examine the interpretation that the positive correlation in the
Gain condition was a product of low task demands, we replicated
Study 2 with time pressure and a secondary requirement to per-
form an arithmetic task between choice trials. We expected to
replicate the negative correlation observed in Study 2 for risky
losses, but not the positive correlation observed for risky gains.
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METHOD
Participants
Forty undergraduate students from the Technion (20 women and
20 men) participated in the experiment. Their average age was 24
(ranging from 19 to 28). Participants were given a ﬁxed fee and
were also compensated according to the number of points earned
intheexperimentaltask,withaconversionrateof0.1IsraeliShekel
per 1 point earned.
Behavioral task
The decision task consisted of two buttons and two counters,as in
Study 2. Participants performed 30 trials in each of the two exper-
imentalconditions(MixedandGain).Theorderof theMixedand
Gain task conditions was counter-balanced so that half of the par-
ticipants performed each task ﬁrst. The choice outcomes were as
in Study 2. The participants received no prior information con-
cerning the choice outcomes, and learned to make choices from
their experience. An arithmetic task was administered along with
the decision task, as follows.
Ineachtrialparticipantsmadetheirdecisionandafterwardper-
formedanarithmetictask.Theywererequiredtoaccomplishboth
tasks in 7.5s,and failure to do so resulted in a loss of three points.
The arithmetic problems were presented in the upper section of
thescreen.Theanswersweretypedusingavirtualkeypad.Thetask
involved adding or multiplying a single-digit number with a two-
digitnumber.Theexactnumberswererandomlygeneratedineach
trial (the single-digit number was chosen from a uniform distrib-
ution ranging from 2 to 6, and the two-digit number was chosen
from a uniform distribution ranging from 10 to 17). If partici-
pants answered the arithmetic question incorrectly they received
an“incorrectanswer”feedbackbutcouldgiveotheranswerswithin
the 7.5s time window. The task included a time meter which
noted the time left until the end of each trial. When participants
answered the arithmetic problem correctly the screen elements
of that task were darkened. Each participant was randomly allo-
cated to receive either addition or multiplication questions.As the
allocation of the participants into the addition or multiplication
questions had no effect on the studied correlations, we pooled
across this manipulation.
PD measure
Pre-task pupil size was examined as in Study 1. Due to a tech-
nical problem we did not get pre-task results from one of the
participants, leaving a total of 39 participants.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We ﬁrst examined the difference between risk taking patterns in
the Mixed and Gain conditions. As in Study 2, the proportion
of risky selections in the two task conditions was quite similar,
0.46 (SD=0.19) in the Mixed condition and 0.46 in the Gain
condition (SD=0.25),t(37)=0.02,p =0.98. Scatter plots of risk
taking proportions by pre-task arousal levels (in PD) appear in
Figure 4. In the Mixed condition the participants’ pre-task PD
was negatively correlated with the proportion of risky selections
(r=−0.34, p=0.02, one tailed). However, in the Gain condition
there was no signiﬁcant correlation between the two measures
(r=0.07, p=0.33, one tailed). Thus, the positive association in
FIGURE 4 | Scatter plot and regression lines of the proportion of risky
selections across trials by pre-task PD in Study 3.Top: Mixed condition.
Bottom: Gain condition.
the Gain condition found in Studies 1 and 2 did not emerge in a
statistically signiﬁcant manner in Study 33.
Tosumup,inthisstudywherethedecisiontaskwasperformed
with moderate time pressure and with an additional cognitive
requirement,we replicated the negative correlation between tonic
PD and risk taking with losses. However, as opposed to Study 2,
there was no positive association between arousal and risk taking
in the gain domain. The ﬁndings are therefore consistent with the
prediction of the attentional model of losses, which implies that
3An examination of possible gender effects revealed that the pupil size of women
(Mean=3.83mm., SD=0.83) was not signiﬁcantly different from that of the
men [Mean=4.02mm., SD=1.08], t(37)=0.59, p =0.56. There were also no
signiﬁcant gender differences in risk taking both in the Mixed and Gain conditions.
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losses do not reverse the association between tonic PD and risk
taking but rather, accentuate it.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Several theories of personality and traits predict a negative associ-
ation between arousal level and risk taking (e.g.,Zuckerman et al.,
1964; Gray, 1987; Zuckerman, 1990; Eysenck, 1992). Though the
exact mechanisms that lead to this negative correlation are differ-
ent in each theory, their general idea is similar: they suggest that
people exhibiting lower levels of internal arousal seek stimulation
bytakingrisk.Here,wehypothesizedthatthenegativeassociation
between tonic arousal and risk taking would be enhanced in risks
with losses, due to the simple fact that losses increase arousal and
on-task attention (Yechiam and Hochman, 2011).
Theresultsofourthreepupillometrystudiessupportedthepre-
dicted moderating effect of losses. In Study 1 we have shown that
in a loss-domain task there was a signiﬁcant negative correlation
between pre-task PD and the proportion of risky selections. In an
equivalent gain domain task this negative correlation was much
lower and not statistically signiﬁcant. In Study 2 we examined
whether these effects of losses on arousal–behavior relationship
are due to loss aversion. For this purpose we studied a previ-
ous pupillometry database (Hochman and Yechiam, 2011) which
included a choice task with symmetric gains and losses, and an
equivalenttaskinthegaindomain.Whiletheparticipantsshowed
no loss aversion on average, a negative correlation between pre-
task arousal and risk taking was only observed in the condition
with losses.
Somewhat surprisingly, in this second study we found that
across all trials there was a positive correlation between pre-
task arousal and risk taking in the gain domain. We argued,
however, this positive association did not represent a general pat-
tern. This was supported by a block by block analysis, which
showed that the positive association only appeared in the sec-
ond half of the task. We explicitly examined this assertion in
Study 3, where we showed that administering the decision task
in a more demanding environment (involving time pressure and
a secondary task) eliminated the positive correlation in the gain
domain. In this study, as in Study 1, in the absence of losses there
was a zero correlation between arousal and risk taking, and the
addition of losses produced a negative correlation between these
measures.
We proposed that the negative correlation between tonic
arousal and risk taking in the conditions with losses reﬂects the
effectof lossesonarousalandattention.Thisexplanationwassup-
portedbyourﬁndingsthatlossesledtosigniﬁcantlyelevatedpupil
size and response time compared to equivalent gains during the
decision task. Our results are consistent with past ﬁndings on the
effect of losses on arousal (e.g., Hochman andYechiam, 2011).
Taken together, the current results suggest that losses are an
inherent part of what makes things risky. Indeed, the dictionary
deﬁnition of risk equates it with loss. For example, In Merriam
Webster(2011)risk’sﬁrstdeﬁnitionis“possibilityof lossorinjury
(peril).” Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED, 1982)
deﬁnes risk as “hazard, danger, exposure to mischance, or peril.”
Indeed,while there is some disagreement about the ancient origin
of the word, it is considered to have come to the English language
from the French word risque, and in this language it was adapted
from Italian risco, which stands for“navigating among dangerous
rocks” (Timmerman, 1986). In Hebrew the word “sikun” which
denotes risk is derived from sakana,or danger. The economic def-
initionof risk,whichisbasedonthevarianceof theoutcomesand
is almost universally accepted as a way of operationally deﬁning
risk, ignores the relation between risk and losses.
Here we have shown that losses matter. When individuals with
low tonic arousal take risk they only do so for risks that involve
losses. Therefore, in adjusting their behavioral responses to their
arousal states, people “acknowledge” things as risky only when
losses are part of them. In risks that do not include losses,the link
between arousal and risk taking is severed. We have also shown
that this property of losses does not depend on loss aversion,
and emerges in experience-based tasks,where typically and in our
studyaswell,nolossaversionisexhibited(Erevetal.,2008).Thus,
the studied effect of losses appears to be quite general. We have
therefore suggested that it may be due to the effect of losses on
arousalandattention,ratherthanduetoanasymmetryindecision
weights.
Ourﬁndingsdonotpreclude,however,thattheremaybeother
factors which can serve as cues that a given situation is risky. Pos-
sibly, after a prolonged learning period individuals may learn to
associateanalternativeproducingrelativegainsandrelative-losses
(or small gains) as risky. Yet in our study this did not happen in
the course of 100 repeated choice trials. Factors such as the size of
the relative-loss could play a part in this. Another important lim-
itation of the current studies is the small sample sizes used. This
issueisespeciallypertinentinthecontextof examiningindividual
differences (see e.g., Stanovich and West, 2008).
The current ﬁndings may explain some of the mixed ﬁndings
in the literature on the association between physiological indices
of tonic arousal and sensation seeking. Gerra et al.’s (1999) study
of healthy adults demonstrated a positive association between NE
concentration and sensation seeking on Zuckerman et al.’s (1964)
scale, whereas similar studies of clinical populations reported
negative correlations (Ballenger et al., 1983; Arque et al., 1988;
Zuckerman, 1994). Studies of tonic endocrine levels in patholog-
ical gamblers also obtained mixed results (Ramirez et al., 1988;
Roy et al.,1988; Schmitt et al.,1998). The Sensation Seeking Scale
is a list of activities (e.g.,“I would like to take the sport of water
skiing,” “I would not like to learn to ﬂy an airplane”) without
explicit information concerning the perceived outcomes of those
activities.Possibly,someindividualsﬁndtheseactivitiesmoredan-
gerous; and this activates the negative association between tonic
arousal and risk taking.Yet for others who ﬁnd these activities less
dangerous, this may not occur.
The current ﬁndings may also be relevant to the issue of risk
communication. The experimental results suggest that presenting
the negative side effect of risky products (e.g.,cigarets) is a double
edged sword. On the one hand,it reduces the attractiveness of the
riskyalternative;butontheotherhanditmayincreasethearousal
associated with it and this can actually attract some individuals.
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